Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the concept of a thing. For example, if I have the concept of a ball, the predicate red further determines this concept into the concept of a red ball.
It is a view of predication under which being/existence is not a "real" predicate discussed in Transcendental Dialectic (Chapter III, Section 4): "Anything we please can be made to serve as a logical predicate; the subject can even be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content. God exists Existence is not a predicate My current understanding: Subject: that which a sentence is about.
He proposes that existence is not a predicate, or quality. If god doesn't exist then god is not the greatest being imaginable Ergo 3.
And perhaps there is much to be said for this assertion ... .In the Proslogion, however, Anselm does not seem to be arguing that'— exists' is or is not a first-level predicate. We don't think an imaginary ball and a ball are the same thing, so obviously the difference between imaginary things and real things isn't that real things have Being and imaginary things don't. If God didn't exist, God wouldn't be God (by definition). [...] The small word 'is' adds no new predicate. Ideas of Interest from The Critique of Pure Reason Define the term " á priori judgment" with the help of a dictionary, and give several different examples of an á priori judgment. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. [Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 625] This does not mean that Kant embraced the Frege-Russell thesis. The Ontological argument for god. there's no line of inference which would allow you to conclude this.
In the Proslogion, however, Anselm does not seem to be arguing that ‘— exists’ is or is not a first-level predicate.
By predicate, I think he means a "property" of the entity, for example, the predicate of being tall. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. ‘“Being” is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. "Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing.
The proposition, 'God is omnipotent', contains two concepts, each of which has its object -- God and omnipotence.
Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a concept of something that can be added to the concept of a thing. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. Yes: existence is a property. 1. God is the greatest being imaginable 2.
he adopts both conclusions of Kant's refutation in his Critique of Pure Reason (B 620ff), namely that (1) "all existential propositions are synthetic" and that (2) "Being is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing." This is because existence does not add to the essence of a being, but merely indicates its occurrence in reality. 'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. (Critique of … It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. It is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves.
Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. that ‘Being is obviously not a real predicate.’ And perhaps there is much to be said for this assertion … . A predicate is that part of a statement that states information to the subject term; predicates inform us of the properties a thing has. Objection 2: Existence isn’t a predicate.
It is merely the positing of a thing, and of certain determinations in themselves.
Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. It is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves. But the real question is: a property of what? The idea that Kant's dictum may be true, yet Anselm nowhere presupposes or commits himself to anything in opposition to it, is thus rather popular. It does not follow that if existence is a real predicate (kant denied it to be a real predicate, not a predicate), then something could exist and have no other property. “Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the concept of a thing. This is the meaning that I'm aware of and which is the meaning we use in mathematical logic.
It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves.